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"Remember that time is money."
-Benjamin Franklin
I. INTRODUCTION
HE common law and commentators have grappled with the ques-
tion of the time to measure damages under anticipatory repudia-
tion.1 At the moment, a party who repudiates a contract is at the
mercy of the courts. This Comment attempts to resolve the uncertainty
and confusion by proposing a standard for determining the time a court
should use in measuring damages.
Anticipatory repudiation is found in Article 2 of the Uniform Commer-
cial Code (U.C.C. or Code), which is " probably the best-conceived and
best-drafted part of the Code. '2 Nonetheless, Part 7 of Article 2 on dam-
ages is one of the most convoluted portions of the U.C.C.3 The delinea-
tion of remedies does not match the precision of the drafters'
conception,4 and the market-based damages under the U.C.C. are "curi-
ously inconsistent and almost incoherent in places."' 5 This inevitably in-
* Law Clerk to the Honorable Thad Heartfield, United States District Judge for the
Eastern District of Texas, 1999-2000. B.A., Yale, 1996; J.D., Southern Methodist Univer-
sity School of Law, 1999.
1. See 1 Roy R. ANDERSON, DAMAGES UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
§ 9:17, at 42 (1988); Alex Devience, Jr., The Recommendations to Revise Article 2, 24
U.C.C. L.J. 349, 371 (1992); Thomas H. Jackson, "Anticipatory Repudiation" and the Tem-
poral Element of Contract Law: An Economic Inquiry Into Contract Damages in Cases of
Prospective Nonperformance, 31 STAN. L. REV. 69, 71 (1978); E. Hunter Taylor, Jr., The
Impact of Article 2 of the U.C.C. on the Doctrine of Anticipatory Repudiation, 9 B.C. IN-
DUS. & COM. L. REV. 917, 940-41 (1968); Note, Some Problems in Measuring Damages for
Anticipatory Breach of a Contract of Sale, 52 HARV. L. REV. 817, 818-19 (1939).
2. John A. Sebert, Jr., Remedies Under Article Two of the Uniform Commercial Code:
An Agenda for Review, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 360, 362 (1981).
3. See id. at 363. This should not be surprising, however, since the remedies section
substantially departs from prior law. See id.
4. See Ellen A. Peters, Remedies for Breach of Contracts Relating to the Sale of
Goods Under the Uniform Commercial Code: A Roadmap for Article Two, 73 YALE L.J.
199, 204 (1963).
5. Jackson, supra note 1, at 103; see Peters, supra note 4, at 204 ("Furthermore, the
interrelationship between the various remedies is often left unnecessarily obscure in Arti-
cle 2; a remedy which is permitted by one section appears to be interdicted by another;
1787
SMU LAW REVIEW
terferes with the goal of Article 2 to provide objective, workable criteria
for structuring the relationship between parties.6
Measuring damages for anticipatory repudiation in the U.C.C. merely
mirrors the uncertainty in the common law.7 Determining the time to use
to measure damages for an anticipatory repudiation involves one of the
most confusing interpretive problems in the U.C.C.8 The entangled Code
provisions relating to the time to measure damages include the buyers'
and sellers' remedies and the interaction of sections 2-610, 2-708, 2-713,
and 2-723. 9 When untangling this confusion, a measure of damages
should be adopted that will ensure the effective implementation of the
underlying remedial policies of the U.C.C.' 0
This comment will trace the history of the U.C.C. provisions concern-
ing anticipatory repudiation in legislative history, commentaries, and case
law. It will then propose a resolution to the statutory confusion by sug-
gesting that damages for anticipatory repudiation should be measured at
the time an aggrieved party should cover, which is the equivalent of a
commercially reasonable time after she learns of the repudiation.
II. WHAT IS ANTICIPATORY REPUDIATION?
Anticipatory repudiation" originated in American and English com-
mon law in the mid-1800s with the watershed case of Hochster v. de la
Tour.'2 Lord Chief Justice Campbell, concerned that the nonbreaching
party would be forced to perform under the repudiated contract, 13 cre-
ated the right to sue for anticipatory repudiation prior to the time of
conduct apparently harmless when viewed from the vantage of one provision is fraught
with danger when another section is considered."). But see Taylor, supra note 1, at 941
("Even though not without weaknesses, the Code's approach to anticipatory repudiation
should be considered a sound one.").
6. See Peters, supra note 4, at 205. The comments to the U.C.C. provide little or no
relief for the textual confusion of the Code. See id. Many comments are ineffectively
bound by prior law, and some are inappropriately tied to earlier versions of the Code. See
id.
7. See Jackson, supra note 1, at 71. But see Taylor, supra note 1, at 940 ("The
[U.C.C.] through its treatment of the doctrine of anticipatory repudiation should contrib-
ute greatly to overcoming some of the basic weaknesses in the application of the doctrine
under the general contract law.").
8. See JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 6-7,
at 318 (3d ed. 1988); 1 ANDERSON, supra note 1, § 9:17, at 42; see also George I. Wallach,
Anticipatory Repudiation and the U.C.C., 13 U.C.C. L.J. 48, 64 (1980) (stating that courts
face difficulties in choosing between possibilities).
9. See WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 8, § 6-7, at 322, 324 n.19.
10. See Sebert, supra note 2, at 374.
11. Arthur Corbin uses the term "anticipatory breach" instead of "anticipatory repudi-
ation." See 5 ARTHUR LITTON CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACT'S § 1053, at 309 (1964).
Corbin notes that the parties never promised to abstain from repudiating. See id. Thus
anticipatory breach in Corbin's terminology refers to the duty to render the performance
that the parties bargained for, rather than the non-existent duty not to repudiate the con-
tract. See id.
12. 118 Eng. Rep. 922 (Q.B. 1853).




Early commentators of anticipatory repudiation criticized its logic.
Under classic contract analysis, courts considered contracts to be a prom-
ise for performance. These promises could not be breached until the ac-
tual time of performance. 15 Thus, there are no legal obligations until the
time of performance. 16 Despite the almost accidental creation of the doc-
trine of anticipatory repudiation, it has become firmly established in
American and English law. 17
The doctrine of anticipatory repudiation rests on the notion that
neither party will frustrate the other party's bargained-for expectation in-
terest.18 A repudiation does not automatically destroy the primary con-
tract interest, so the contract may still be enforced.19 The pre-
performance contract right frequently has its own market value, deter-
mined by the present value of the future performance, reduced by the
probability that the performance will not occur.20 Despite this theoretical
market value, in reality the anticipatory repudiation will most likely de-
value all or part of the contract right.21 Courts implicitly acknowledge
that the expectation interest outweighs the uncertainty inherent in mea-
suring anticipatory repudiation damages.22
To constitute anticipatory repudiation, the words or conduct creating
anticipatory repudiation must be distinct, unequivocal, and absolute. 23
Given these stringent requirements, anticipatory repudiations are atypi-
cal.24 Even when a party intends to repudiate a contract before time of
performance, he generally refuses to be distinct, unequivocal, or absolute
in order to anticipatorily repudiate .25 Thus, anticipatory repudiation
cases require unique facts involving uncommon conduct by both buyer
14. See id. at 927-28 ("[Ulpon a contract to do an act on a future day, a renunciation of
the contract by one party dispenses with a condition to be performed in the meantime by
the other, there seems no reason for requiring that other to wait till the day arrives before
seeking his remedy by action ... ").
15. See Jackson, supra note 1, at 73; Janice C. Vyn, Comment, Anticipatory Repudia-
tion Under the Uniform Commercial Code: Interpretation, Analysis, and Problems, 30 Sw.
L.J. 601, 602 (1976) ("Since the absolute duty to perform has not yet arisen according to
the contract's terms, in a strict sense no breach has occurred.").
16. See Taylor, supra note 1, at 917.
17. See id. at 918-19.
18. See id. at 919.
19. See 5 CORBIN, supra note 11, at 313. According to Corbin, remedial rights are
substituted for the primary right to full performance, so the power to earn full payment
vanishes. See id. Completion of performance would cause economic waste; besides, the
remedies are the pecuniary equivalent of full performance of the contract. See id. at 313-
14.
20. See id. at 313.
21. See id.
22. See Taylor, supra note 1, at 920.
23. Wallach, supra note 8, at 50-51.
24. See 1 ANDERSON, supra note 1, § 9:17, at 45.
25. See id. at 45-46. "They may wheedle or whine or threaten or cajole, do all sorts of
distasteful things, but rarely will they voluntarily put themselves in the posture of wrong-




Under the common law, the party who believes that the other party has
anticipatorily repudiated is in the difficult and uncomfortable situation of
predicting whether a court will find an anticipatory repudiation.2 7 If that
party suspends performance and is wrong, the court will find that he was
the first to breach the contract.28 Therefore, deciding whether there has
been an anticipatory repudiation is "[o]ne of the most difficult and poten-
tially risky decisions that an attorney may have to make. '29
Under the pre-Code law, anticipatory repudiation damages "were mea-
sured by the difference between the contract price and the market price
at the time and place for performance. '30 However, if the case went to
trial before the performance date, damages would be calculated at the
market price at the time of trial.31 Courts considered this figure the best
evidence of the future market price.32 The U.C.C. followed the former
rule but not the latter.33
Section 2-610 of the U.C.C. also offers a remedy for breach of contract
before time of performance. 34 When an anticipatory repudiation occurs,
the buyer may cancel the contract, recover the price paid to the seller,
and seek either cover or the difference between the contract price and the
market price.35 But if the aggrieved party does not cancel the contract,
make a material change his position, or inform the repudiator that he
considers the repudiation to be final, the repudiator may withdraw his
repudiation and reinstate the contract.36 The Code addresses the risk as-
sociated with accurately predicting an anticipatory repudiation by provid-
ing section 2-609, which allows a party to demand adequate assurance
when the party is insecure.37
The common law made a distinction between repudiation of a contract
whose performance is entirely in the future and repudiation after partial
performance. 38 The U.C.C., however, never defines repudiation.39 The
26. See id.
27. See Wallach, supra note 8, at 50.
28. See Gregory S. Crespi, The Adequate Assurances Doctrine After U.C.C. § 2-609: A
Test of the Efficiency of the Common Law, 38 VILL. L. REv. 179, 183 (1993); Wallach, supra
note 8, at 50.
29. John R. Trentacosta, Performance and Breach of Contracts Under U.C.C. Article 2,
74 MICH. B.J. 548, 549 (1995).
30. Taylor, supra note 1, at 928.
31. See id.
32. See id. at 928 n.39.
33. See id. at 928.
34. See U.C.C. § 2-610; WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 8, § 6-7, at 319.
35. See U.C.C. §§ 2-610, 2-711; WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 8, § 6-7, at 319.
36. See U.C.C. § 2-611; WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 8, § 6-7, at 326.
37. See U.C.C. § 2-609; 67A AM. JUR. 2D Sales § 877 (1985).
38. See Jackson, supra note 1, at 70. This distinction is "[fior reasons that are not
entirely clear .. " Id.; see also infra note 122 and accompanying text (regarding Professor
Edwin W. Patterson's concern that repudiation in the U.C.C. was not consistent with New
York law, wherein repudiation referred to a contract whose entire performance lay in the
future).
39. See Peters, supra note 4, at 264; Taylor, supra note 1, at 922.
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term repudiation in the context of this comment will refer to an agree-
ment whose performance is entirely in the future.
III. INTERACTION OF ANTICIPATORY REPUDIATION
PROVISIONS UNDER THE U.C.C.
There are six Code sections that are necessary to consider when analyz-
ing the issue of when to measure damages for an anticipatory repudiation
under the U.C.C.: sections 2-610, 2-708(1), 2-713, 2-706, 2-712, and 2-
723.40
A. TEXT OF THE PROVISIONS
Anticipatory repudiation first appears in U.C.C. section 2-610.41 If a
party repudiates a contract before the time for performance, thereby sub-
stantially impairing the value of the contract to the non-repudiating party,
the aggrieved party has two choices: (1) await performance for a commer-
cially reasonable time; or (2) utilize any remedy for breach in sections 2-
703 (seller's remedies) or 2-711 (buyer's remedies). This second choice is
available to the aggrieved party regardless of whether he has notified the
repudiating party that he is awaiting performance or whether he has
urged the repudiating party to retract.42 If the aggrieved party waits for
performance beyond a reasonable time under the first choice in section 2-
610, he cannot recover the damages that he could have avoided.43 Under
the second choice, the aggrieved party can resort to any remedy he
chooses if he fulfills the good faith requirement under section 1-203.44
The aggrieved party may suspend his performance whether he waits a
commercially reasonable time for performance or whether he seeks
remedies.45
If the aggrieved party is a seller and chooses to resort to remedies for
breach, he has a number of options: (1) withhold delivery of the goods; 46
(2) stop delivery by any bailee;47 (3) proceed under section 2-704 for
goods unidentified to the contract;48 (4) resell the goods and recover
40. See Wallach, supra note 8, at 60.
41. U.C.C. § 2-610.
42. See id.
43. See U.C.C. § 2-610 cmt. 1. The text of section 2-610 gives no guidance of what
remedies are available after a party awaits performance for a commercially reasonable
time. See infra notes 125-27 and accompanying text (expressing Professor Patterson's con-
cern that waiting the commercially reasonable time does not preclude the later seeking of
remedies). The commentary, however, implies that the aggrieved party can seek remedies,
but they are limited by the mitigation principle. See U.C.C. § 2-610 cmt. 1.
44. See U.C.C. § 2-610 cmt. 4. Section 1-203 states that "[e]very contract or duty
within this Act imposes an obligation of good faith in its performance or enforcement."
U.C.C. § 1-203.
45. See U.C.C. § 2-610(c).
46. See U.C.C. §§ 2-610(c), 2-703(a).
47. See U.C.C. §§ 2-610(c), 2-703(b).
48. See U.C.C. §§ 2-610(c), 2-703(c).
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under section 2-706;4 9 (5) recover damages under section 2-708 or recover
price under section 2-709;50 and (6) cancel.51
If the aggrieved party is a buyer, he has the remedies available in sec-
tion 2-711.52 When the seller repudiates the contract, the buyer may can-
cel and recover the amount of the price he has already paid.53 The buyer
may also either cover under section 2-712 or recover damages under the
market-contract differential in section 2-713.54 If the buyer seeks the
cover remedy under section 2-712, the buyer can recover the difference
between the cost of cover of substitute goods and the contract price.55
Cover is not a mandatory remedy,56 but consequential damages are lim-
ited by what the buyer could have prevented by covering within a reason-
able time.57 In addition, the buyer may either recover the goods if they
have been identified, as provided in section 2-502, or obtain specific per-
formance or replevy as provided in section 2-716.58
Section 2-713(1) causes much of the confusion and ambiguity of dam-
ages when the buyer is the aggrieved party of an anticipatory repudiation.
The interpretive challenge is to determine when to measure a buyer's
damages after a seller repudiates a contract before performance is due.59
Under section 2-713(1), the measure of damages for a seller's repudiation
is the market price at the time when the buyer "learned of the breach"
less the contract price.60 "Learned of the breach" can support a number
of interpretations for when to measure the buyer's damages. 61 The ac-
companying commentary is not helpful in interpreting the phrase, 62 so
the pivotal question of when the buyer actually learns of the breach re-
mains unanswered. 63 The comments explain that this remedy is only ap-
plicable to the extent the buyer fails to cover, providing a self-contained
49. See U.C.C. § 2-703(d). The Code is ambiguous as to whether it allows the seller to
resell under section 2-706, then recover the difference between the market price at the time
and place for tender and the unpaid contract price under section 2-708. See 67A AM. JUR.
2d § 1092 (1985); Henry Gabriel, The Seller's Election of Remedies Under the Uniform
Commercial Sales Code: An Expectation Theory, 23 WAKE FORESr L. REv. 429, 429
(1988). However, under 1-106, the U.C.C. expresses "[tihe remedies... shall be liberally
administered to the end that the aggrieved party may be put in as good a position as if the
other party had fully performed .... " U.C.C. § 1-106(1). The accompanying comment
affirms that compensatory damages are limited to compensation. See U.C.C. § 1-106 cmt 1.
The seller would receive a windfall if the Code permitted both the resale formula, which
fully compensates the aggrieved seller, and recovery under Section 2-708.
50. See U.C.C. § 2-703(e).
51. See U.C.C. § 2-703(f).
52. See U.C.C. §§ 2-610(b), 2-711.
53. See U.C.C. § 2-711(1).
54. See U.C.C. § 2-711(l)(a), (b).
55. See U.C.C. § 2-712.
56. See U.C.C. § 2-712(3) cmt. 3.
57. See U.C.C. § 2-712 cmt. 3.
58. See U.C.C. § 2-711(2).
59. See Sebert, supra note 2, at 372.
60. See U.C.C. § 2-713(1).
61. See Wallach, supra note 8, at 61.
62. See U.C.C. § 2-713 cmt. 1.




This market price formula has been harshly criticized as a hypothetical
remedy. 65 By providing the buyer the market-contract differential, which
does not even use the market, the U.C.C. "leaves the remedial goals of
section 2-713 quite unclear." 66 If there is an available market, the buyer
should cover.67 The market formula "is essentially ancillary to the cover
formula. '68 If there is no available market, "it makes little sense to as-
sume an entry into the market. '69
Section 2-723 governs the measurement of damages for the aggrieved
party, either buyer or seller, when the anticipatory repudiation action
comes to trial before time of performance. 70 Under this circumstance,
damages are measured at the price "when the aggrieved party learned of
the repudiation. ' 71 The accompanying comment explains that this sec-
tion was included to alleviate the most obvious difficulties associated with
determining market price.72 Section 2-723, however, yields to other
methods of determining market price.73 The section should not be read
to exclude other reasonable methods of measuring damages according to
the necessity of particular facts. 74
B. HISTORY OF THE U.C.C.
Article 2 is the oldest section of the U.C.C.; the basic draft dates from
1940.75 The predecessor of Article 2 was the Uniform Sales Act. The
American Law Institute (ALI)76 and the National Conference of Com-
missioners on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL)77 began a joint effort to
create a comprehensive code of commercial law.78 Led by Karl Llewel-
lyn, the two national organizations were involved in a massive mobiliza-
tion of time and resources to create what eventually became the Uniform
Commercial Code. As Chief Reporter, Karl Llewellyn was the primary,
64. See U.C.C. § 2-713 cmt. 5.
65. See Robert Childres, Buyer's Remedies: The Danger of Section 2-713,72 Nw. U. L.
REV. 837, 842-43 (1978). This section is "a marvelous paradigm of abstraction." Id. at 841.
66. Id. at 842.
67. See id.
68. Childres, supra note 65, at 843.
69. Jackson, supra note 1, at 102.
70. See U.C.C. § 2-723(1).
71. Id.
72. See U.C.C. § 2-723 cmt.
73. See id.
74. See id.
75. See Charles W. Mooney, Jr., Proposed Revision of Article 2, C465 ALI-ABA 403,
405 (1989).
76. ALl is an association of judges, attorneys, and law professors and the author of
Restatements of law. See N.Y. STATE L. REV. COMM'N, 1 STUDY OF THE UNIFORM COM-
MERCIAL CODE, LEG. Doc. No. 65 at 11 (1955) [hereinafter N.Y. STATE L. REV. COMM'N].
77. NCCUSL is composed of officers designated by states as Commissioner, who con-
sult with other Commissioners with the goals of promoting uniform legislation throughout
the United States. See N.Y. STATE L. REV. COMM'N, supra note 76, at 11.
78. See , UNIF. REVISED SALES ACT iii (Proposed Final Draft No. 1 1944) [hereinafter
UNIF. REVISED SALES Act].
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commanding force behind the drafting of the U.C.C.79 Llewellyn had a
strong sense of the relationship between law and commerce, and he im-
ported this into the drafting of the U.C.C.80
The first step in the creation of the U.C.C. was to overhaul the existing
Uniform Sales Act. In 1938, the Merchants Association of New York
City proposed a federal sales act to regulate interstate sales.81 This
prompted NCCUSL to revise its Uniform Sales Act. The initial drafts of
the revised Uniform Sales Act were finished in 1940. The project became
a joint venture between the ALI and the NCCUSL in 1944 with Karl
Llewellyn as the Reporter and Soia Mentschikoff as the Associate Re-
porter. The Uniform Revised Sales Act became the Sales Chapter of the
U.C.C.82
The ALl and NCCUSL published The Code of Commercial Law in
1946 as the most recent draft version of six of the articles of the uniform
code scheduled to be completed in 1949.83 The two organizations as-
serted that preparation of the code had advanced enough to publish this
portion.84 By 1949 the ALI and NCCUSL had published the first draft of
the U.C.C. with comments as intended.8 5
By spring 1950 after the publication of the Proposed Final Draft of the
U.C.C., the codification effort more resembled a code.86 The statute was
divided into the eleven articles, each segmented into parts.8 7 Despite its
label of finality, this draft experienced further revisions.88 So many
changes were made to the Proposed Final Draft No. 2 of the U.C.C. of
1951 that the changes from the 1950 version were symbolically
indicated.8 9
79. See Imad D. Abyad, Note, Commercial Reasonableness in Karl Llewellyn's Uni-
form Commercial Code Jurisprudence, 83 VA. L. REV. 429, 429 (1997). Llewellyn recog-
nized the feasibility of a commercial code: "The body of material is of itself both central,
large, highly important, and a working unit." Karl Llewellyn's notes, Memorandum to Ex-
ecutive Committee, Committee on Scope and Program, Section on Uniform Commercial
Acts.
80. See William A. Schnader, A Short History of the Preparation and Enactment of the
Uniform Commercial Code, 22 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1, 4 ("He insisted that the provisions of
the Code should be drafted from the standpoint of what actually takes place from day to
day in the commercial world rather than from the standpoint of what appeared in statutes
and decisions.").
81. See N.Y. STATE L. REV. COMM'N, supra note 76, at 11.
82. See UNIF. REVISED SALES ACT, supra note 78, at iii ("Should our two organiza-
tions proceed to prepare a Commercial Code the Revised Sales Act will constitute the
Sales Chapter.").
83. See THE CODE OF COMMERCIAL LAW, introductory statement (1948).
84. See id.
85. See N.Y. STATE L. REV. COMM'N, supra note 76, at 12.
86. See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE Vii-XXiV (Proposed Final Draft 1950) [hereinaf-
ter 1950 Proposed Final Draft].
87. See id.
88. See Preliminary Report of Study Group, Revising Article 2 3 (March 1, 1990)
[hereinafter Prelim. Report].
89. See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE V (Proposed Final Draft No. 2 1951) [hereinaf-
ter 1951 Proposed Final Draft].
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The Official Draft was published in 1952 after final approval for Arti-
cles 4 and 5 at the Joint Meeting of the ALI and the NCCUSL in New
York on Sept. 15, 1951.90 The newly created Editorial Board proposed
additional changes that were promulgated in the 1953 official text of the
U.C.C.91 The American Bar Association quickly endorsed Article 2.92
Pennsylvania was the first state to enact the U.C.C.93 The Penn-
sylvania legislature enacted the 1953 Official Text in April 1953, effective
July 1, 1954.94 Several states conducted in-depth studies of the U.C.C. in
contemplation of adoption, including New York.95 Responding to the
recommendation of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York,
the New York Law Revision Commission held U.C.C. hearings in 1954.96
Their conclusions were reported in 1955, most of which were critical of
the U.C.C. 97 The Law Revision Commission did not recommend that
New York enact the U.C.C.98
This criticism by the commercially vital State of New York99 prompted
the Editorial Board to review earlier recommendations for changing the
1953 text of Article 2 and then recommend further revisions in 1956.100
The New York Law Revision Commission undertook the last thorough
review of Article 2, which prompted the changes by the Editorial Board
in the 1958 Official Text with Comments.' 10 The Article 2 revisions be-
tween the 1959 draft of the U.C.C. and the 1962 Official text were rela-
tively minor. 10 2 Subsequently, every state but Louisiana enacted this
revision in its entirety.
The U.C.C. was flexible enough to ensure its permanence.10 3 Open-
ended standards such as reasonableness, course of dealing, and usage of
trade left the courts with the maneuverability to rule according to the
90. See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE v (Official Draft 1952) [hereinafter 1952 Offi-
cial Edition]; N.Y. STATE L. REV. COMM'N, supra note 76, at 12. Professor Charles Bunn
revised and edited the comments using documents from earlier drafts and the advice of the
reportorial staff and the editorial board. See id.
91. See Prelim. Report, supra note 88, at 3.
92. See Deanna Wise, Comment, Proposed Amendments to Article 2 of the Uniform
Commercial Code: The Tangled Web of Anticipatory Repudiation and the Right to Demand
Assurances, 40 U. KAN. L. REV. 287, 287 (1991).
93. See id.
94. See id.
95. See N.Y. STATE L. REV. COMM'N, supra note 76, at 6-7.
96. See N.Y. STATE L. REV. OMM'N, supra note 76, at 6-7, 14. The record of the
hearings consisted of over 1500 typewritten pages, expanding to 2000 pages with related
documents. See id.
97. The New York Revision Commission found the U.C.C. limited rather than en-
larged flexibility in New York law. See N.Y. STATE L. REV. COMM'N, supra note 76, at 15.
98. See N.Y. STATE L. REV. COMM'N, supra note 76, at 5.
99. See id. at 8. A number of state legislatures notified the NY Revision Commission
that action on the adoption of the U.C.C. would be deferred pending the report of the
Revision Commission and knowledge of the course of action to be taken by New York.
See id.
100. See id. at 8-9.
101. See id.
102. See Sebert, supra note 2, at 361 n.8.
103. See Abyad, supra note 79, at 441.
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reality of commercial transactions. 10 4 "While such standards produce un-
certainty, that uncertainty merely mirrors reality.' 105
C. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF U.C.C. PROVISIONS RELATING TO
ANTICIPATORY REPUDIATION
1. Section 2-610
The modem version of section 2-610 started with section 45 of the 1942
Revised Uniform Sales Act entitled "Anticipatory Breach; Defective In-
stallment." Section 45 states that if the buyer or seller demonstrates the
intention not to fulfill the duties or conditions imposed on him, the other
party is free to treat this as a breach and seek any remedy or remedial
right.106
The fifth Preliminary Draft declares that the "[m]anifestation by either
party of an intention not to perform the duties or fulfill the conditions
resting on him constitutes an anticipatory breach of the contract." 107 The
aggrieved party has several options: (1) to suspend his own performance;
(2) to treat this as a breach of contract and seek a remedy under the Act
or wait for the time of performance; and (3) to cancel the contract.1 0 8
The aggrieved party is presumed to be waiting for the other's perform-
ance unless notice is given to the contrary.1' 9
Section 99 of the 1948 Code of Commercial Law gave the aggrieved
party whose contract value was substantially impaired the right to (1)
either sue for any remedy for breach, await performance, or negotiate for
a retraction and (2) suspend his own performance. 110 In this version, un-
like previous versions, the section was entitled "Anticipatory Repudia-
tion" instead of anticipatory breach."' This change was probably due to
the separation and removal of anticipatory repudiation from the provi-
sion covering installment contracts under which performance has begun
but the remaining performance was being repudiated.
Section 2-610 of the Spring 1950 Proposed Final Draft of the U.C.C.
was entitled "Anticipatory Repudiation" and had changed little from its
previous version in the Code of Commercial Law. 112 The commentary
explains
[a]fter repudiation, the aggrieved party may immediately resort to
any remedy he chooses. Inaction and silence by the aggrieved party
may leave the matter open but it cannot be regarded as misleading
104. See Sebert, supra note 2, at 362; Abyad, supra note 79, at 429; see also U.C.C. § 1-
102 cmt. 1.
105. Sebert, supra note 2, at 362.
106. See Karl Llewellyn's notes, IV2a, 1942 Revised Uniform Sales Act: Supplement,
Part V, § 45(l) at 190 (1942).
107. Karl Llewellyn's notes, Preliminary Draft No. 5, First Installment, § 67(1).
108. See id. § 67(2).
109. See id. § 67(3).
110. THE CODE OF COMMERCIAL LAW § 99.
111. See id.
112. See U.C.C. § 2-610 (Proposed Final Draft, Spring 1950).
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the repudiating party. Therefore the aggrieved party is left free to
proceed at any time with his options under this section, unless he has
taken some positive action which in good faith requires notification
to the other party before the remedy is pursued. 13
The language of the provision did not change in the second Proposed
Final Draft of the U.C.C. of Spring 1951114 nor the Official Draft of the
U.C.C. of 1952.115
In the New York Law Revision Commission's endeavor to evaluate the
U.C.C., Professor Edwin W. Patterson of Columbia Law School found
section 2-610 generally in line with New York law, but contained "some
material ambiguities, omissions and even contradictions."' 16 The defini-
tion of "repudiation" concerned Patterson-he feared repudiation could
be defined to include a party who materially breached a contract and
repudiated it, thus capable of retracting both an anticipatory repudiation
and a breach of contract under 2-611.117 He notes, "[iut would seem,
then, that section 2-610 does not clearly safeguard this result."118
Professor Patterson also expressed concern that the section did not
match New York law, which held that anticipatory repudiation damages
in certain situations are measured at the time of repudiation, not the time
of performance.119 The U.C.C. allows the aggrieved party the resale or
cover differential, which has three disadvantages according to Professor
Patterson: (1) the aggrieved party would be discouraged from resale or
cover transactions because the other party could attack the transaction on
lack of good faith or because it was accomplished in an unreasonable
manner; (2) since the aggrieved party is not required to resale or cover,
he may speculate at the other party's peril; and (3) the resale or cover
transaction would be binding on the repudiating party to reimburse, but
any profit from the transaction accrues to the aggrieved party without
having to account for the profit.' 20
In addition, the text of (a) and (b) gave Professor Patterson pause.121
A literal reading of the language section 2-610 with its "sharp alternative"
of either (a) or (b) was the opposite of New York law. 122 The professor
argued that "the language should make it clear that merely choosing (b)
[allowing the party to await performance or negotiate for retraction] does
not preclude later choosing (a) [permitting the aggrieved party to resort
to any remedy for breach].' 23
113. See id. § 2-610 cmt. 4.
114. See U.C.C. § 2-610 (Proposed Final Draft No. 2 1951).
115. See U.C.C. § 2-610 (Official Draft 1952).
116. N.Y. STATE L. REV. COMM'N, STUDY OF THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, AR-
TICLE 1-GENERAL PROVISIONS, at 670 (1955) (analysis made by Prof. Edwin W. Patter-
son) [hereinafter 2 N.Y. STATE L. REV. COMM'N].
117. See id. at 671.
118. Id.
119. See id. at 672.
120. See id. at 673.
121. See id. at 674; U.C.C. § 2-610 (Official Draft 1952).
122. 2 N.Y. STATE L. REV. COMM'N, supra note 116, at 674.
123. Id.; see also 1952 U.C.C. § 2-610 (Official Draft 1952).
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Patterson noted that in section 2-610(c) "'may suspend' suggests that
the repudiatee may resume his own performance, under some unspecified
circumstances, and recover damages accordingly." 124 This is contrary to
American common law in which the aggrieved party cannot enhance his
damages by continuing performance after the repudiation; thus the ag-
grieved party must stop performing following a repudiation. 12
-
Due to the criticism and concerns of the New York Law Revision Com-
mission, the Editorial Board made substantial changes in section 2-610,
where the text had remained consistent for a number of previous years.
The 1957 Official Edition of the U.C.C. adopted most of the suggested
changes. In deference to the concern of the breadth of "repudiation,"
section 2-610 restricts anticipatory repudiation to a "contract with respect
to a performance not yet due."'1 26 Also, subsection (b) allows the ag-
grieved party "for a commercially reasonable time [to] await perform-
ance." 27 This provision prevents the aggrieved party from awaiting
performance indefinitely, then recovering full damages.' 28 Changing for-
mer subsection (b) in the 1952 Official Code to allow the aggrieved party
to wait for performance for a commercially reasonable time in the 1957
Official Code implicitly suggests that if the commercially reasonable time
is expended, an aggrieved party may resort to any remedy for breach. 129
The commentary notes that waiting for performance beyond a reasonable
time will not increase the aggrieved party's recoverable damages by the
amount he could have avoided.' 30 This comment also suggests that all
remedies are available following the commercially reasonable waiting pe-
riod. By adding the alternative choice "to identify the goods to the con-
tract notwithstanding breach or to salvage unfinished goods" 131 to section
2-610(c) in the 1957 U.C.C., the drafters circumvented Professor Patter-
son's criticism that the aggrieved party may resume his own performance
notwithstanding repudiation by giving the aggrieved party concrete op-
tions without suggestive abuse of the word "may" in the 1952 U.C.C.132
The only change unrelated to the New York Law Revision Commission
concerned the aggrieved party's ability to resort to any remedy for breach
despite urging retraction and informing the repudiating party that he
124. 2 N.Y. L. REv. COMM'N, supra note 116, at 674-75.
125. See id. at 675.
126. See U.C.C. § 2-610 (1957) (emphasis added to demonstrate the change in text).
127. Id. § 2-610(b) (emphasis added to demonstrate the change in text).
128. See 2 N.Y. STATE L. REv. COMM'N, supra note 116, at 757 (quoting Supp. No. 1,
U.C.C., p.12).
129. See U.C.C. § 2-610 (official Draft 1952); U.C.C. § 2-610 (1957). At the minimum,
New York courts would likely interpret the change in this manner given Professor Patter-
son's criticism that the literal interpretation of section 2-610 of the 1952 Uniform Commer-
cial Code was contrary to New York law. See supra notes 126-30 and accompanying text.
Other courts may not be influenced by this reasoning, however, if they read a "sharp alter-
native" into section 2-610(a) and (b) as Professor Patterson first suggested, despite the
change in the section's language. See 2 N.Y. STATE L. REv. COMM'N, supra note 116, at
674.
130. See U.C.C. § 2-610 cmt. 1 (1957).
131. Id. § 2-610(c).
132. See id.; U.C.C. § 2-610(c) (Official Draft 1952).
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would await the repudiating party's performance. 133
2. Section 2-708
The precursor of U.C.C. section 2-708, which describes the seller's
damages for non-acceptance or repudiation, was section 63 of the Re-
vised Uniform Sales Act entitled "Primary Damages to Seller, Apart
from Resale or Cover." Section 63 explains a seller's remedy when the
buyer breached and the seller failed to "cover" or resell the goods. 34
The section lists the situations in which damages for the price of the
goods is appropriate; in all other situations, the seller's damages are "the
estimated loss resulting in the ordinary course of events from the buyer's
breach, as determined in any manner which is reasonable.' 35 Section 63
also describes the typical reasonable manner to measure damages: "the
difference between the contract price and the market price at the time
when the seller learns of the breach" and three locations depending on
the shipping status of the goods. 136
The most dramatic and telling change in later versions of this section
that result in modem ambiguity among the U.C.C. provisions of when to
measure damages concerns the phrase "learns of the breach," first seen
here in the U.C.C. for sellers not buyers.137 Subsequently, the provision
for sellers morphs this phrase into "time and place of tender."'1 38 The
provision for buyers later becomes "learns of the breach," which is the
source of much academic hand-wringing.' 39 In this version of the Re-
vised Uniform Sales Act, buyers and sellers remedies diverge.' 40
In a 1943 version of the Revised Uniform Sales Act, the seller's mea-
sure of damages for non-acceptance was the price differential between
the unpaid contract price and the market price "at the time of breach.' 141
The parallel buyer's damages are measured "at the time the buyer
learned of the breach."' 42 This precursor of the U.C.C. is the closest the
timing of buyers and sellers remedies are to being identical. Nonetheless,
it is unlikely that the phrases are a distinction without a difference despite
being in the drafting stage. This suggests there is a meaningful difference
between "time learned of the breach" and "time of the breach."
133. See U.C.C. § 2-610(b) (1957).
134. See Karl Llewellyn's notes, IV2f, Consideration in Committee of the Whole of the
Revised Uniform Sales Act (transcript of consideration of sections 37-71) § 63 at 177-78(1941).
135. Id. § 63(2), (3) at 178.
136. Id. § 63(4) at 178.
137. See id-
138. See U.C.C. § 2-708.
139. See U.C.C. § 2-713; see also infra notes 150-70 and accompanying text (describing
the legislative history of the buyer's remedy).
140. See Karl Llewellyn's notes, supra note 134, §§ 63, 70 (stating that the buyer's dam-
ages are measured "at the time when ... the goods should have been received by the
buyer").
141. Karl Llewellyn's notes, V2e, Introductory Comment to Remedies § 102 (1943).
142. Id. at § 107.
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Part VI of the Code of Commercial Law deals with remedies. Section
109 under the heading "Seller's Remedies" describes the "Damages for
Non-Acceptance."' 143 The seller's damages were measured by the "differ-
ence between the price current at the time and place for tender and the
unpaid contract price."'144 There was no substantive change in the renum-
bered section 2-708 of the 1950 Proposed Final Draft.145 The commen-
tary reminds that "[tihe prior uniform statutory provision is followed
generally in setting the current market price at the time and place for
tender as the standard by which damages for non-acceptance are to be
determined."' 146 Neither the 1951 Proposed Final Draft nor the 1952 Of-
ficial Draft of the Uniform Commercial Code changed the text of this
provision. 147
Professor Patterson did not criticize the timing aspect of section 2-708;
he recognized the consistency with New York case law, in which the
seller's damages are "the value of his bargain, which is the difference be-
tween the contract price and the market price at the time and place speci-
fied for delivery of the goods by the terms of the contract. '' 148 He did
question the ambiguity of some of the terminology defining the market-
contract differential, most of which was ultimately changed. 149
Section 2-708 of the 1957 Official Draft of the Uniform Commercial
Code did not change with respect to the timing of when to measure a
seller's damages. It did, however, broaden the seller's damages to "the
measure of damages for non-acceptance or repudiation.'150 This addition
suggests the provision applies to anticipatory repudiation notwithstanding
section 2-723.
3. Section 2-713
Section 70 of the Revised Uniform Sales Act was a precursor of U.C.C.
section 2-713 and described a buyer's damages for non-delivery.151 It al-
lowed a buyer who failed to cover to sue for damages for the nondeliv-
ery.' 52 Damages consisted of the estimated loss ordinarily resulting from
the seller's breach, determined in any reasonable manner.' 53 In the ordi-
nary case this meant "the difference between the contract price and the
market price at the time when and the place where the goods should have
143. See THE CODE OF COMMERCIAL LAW § 109 at 58 (1948).
144. Id.
145. See U.C.C. § 2-708 (Proposed Final Draft 1950).
146. Id. § 2-708 cmt. 1.
147. See U.C.C. § 2-708 (Proposed Final Draft No. 2 1951); U.C.C., § 2-708 (Official
Draft 1952).
148. 2 N.Y. STATE L. REV. COMM'N, supra note 116, at 692.
149. See id. at 695; U.C.C. § 2-708 (1957).
150. See U.C.C. § 2-708 (1957) (emphasis added). Professor Pasley notes that in Sup-
plement No. 1 of the U.C.C. "the change is to extend the rule clearly to the right of repudi-
ation." 2 N.Y. STATE L REV. COMM'N, supra note 116, at 761 (quoting U.C.C. Supp. No. 1,
p.14).
151. See Karl Llewellyn's notes, supra note 134, § 70, at 185-86.
152. See id. § 70(1).
153. See id. § 70(2).
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been received by the buyer."'1 54
In 1943, the language of section 70 dealing with when to measure the
buyer's damages changed significantly. Instead of being the difference
between the contract price and the market price at the time when the
breaching party should have delivered the goods under the contract, the
buyer's measure of damages for non-delivery changed to "the difference
between the unpaid contract price and the comparable market price at the
time the buyer learned of the breach."'55
Section 114 of the Code of Commercial Law measured the buyer's
damages as "the difference between the price current at the time the
buyer learned of the breach and the contract price."'1 56 Apart from re-
numbering, there was no substantive change in section 2-708 of the 1950
Proposed Final Draft.157 The commentary explains that this rule approxi-
mates "the market in which the buyer would have obtained cover had he
sought that relief.' 158 Thus, "the crucial time is the time at which the
buyer learns of the breach."'159 The provision did not change in either the
1951 Proposed Final Draft or the 1952 Official Draft of the U.C.C. 60
Professor Patterson noted the primary differences between Section 2-
713 of the 1952 U.C.C. and the comparable section of the Uniform Sales
Act related to the time when and the place where market value is to be
evaluated.' 6 ' When the buyer "learned of the breach" was "apparently a
change in New York law; but actually it probably is not a change in the
law as applied by New York courts."' 62 At least two New York cases
determined damages when the buyer learned of the default. The cases
purported to apply the special circumstances exception of the Uniform
Sales Act and not change the general law. 163 The cases delayed the time
to measure market beyond the performance date.' 64 Since Professor Pat-
terson accepted the timing underlying the phrase "learned of the breach,"
there was no impetus for its change.
Professor Patterson criticized the word "learned": "[t]he word 'learned'
seems likely to give trouble."'1 65 He suggests "received information of'
for its replacement. Professor Patterson argued that this would avoid two
154. Id. § 70(3). This phrase describing the timing of damages was later co-opted in the
modern seller's market formula. See U.C.C. § 2-708(1). The Official U.C.C. seller's rem-
edy of "time and place of tender" is remarkably similar to "time when.., the goods should
have been received by the buyer." Karl Llewellyn's notes, supra note 134, § 70(3).
155. Karl Llewellyn's notes, supra note 134, §107 (emphasis added).
156. See THE CODE OF COMMERCIAL LAW § 114 at 61 (1948).
157. See id.; U.C.C. § 2-713 (Proposed Final Draft 1950).
158. U.C.C. § 2-713 cmt. 1 (Proposed Final Draft 1951).
159. Id.
160. See U.C.C. § 2-713 (Proposed Final Draft No. 2 1952); U.C.C. § 2-713 (Official
Draft 1952).




164. See WHITE AND SUMMERS § 6-7, supra note 8, at 322.
165. 2 N.Y. STATE L. REV. COMM'N, supra note 116, at 700.
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things: (1) the buyer's investigation of all rumors of the seller's breach;
and (2) the buyer's fraud by arguing that he did not "learn" of the breach
through his own inaction (i.e. fail to open his mail). 166 He also suggested
improving "price current" by replacing it with "market price."'167 Section
2-713 of the 1957 Official Draft of the Uniform Commercial Code did not
change with respect to the time to measure damages, despite Professor
Patterson's suggestion. 168 The provision did absorb Professor Patterson's
improvement by replacing "price current" with "market price."'169
Like section 2-708, this provision was newly extended to repudiation in
addition to breach. 170 This addition contributed confusion to an already
ambiguous tangle of damages for anticipatory repudiation.
4. Section 2-723
Section 2-723, which describes the time and place used to determine
market price, had no comparable analog in the Uniform Sales Act. In the
1943 Revised Uniform Sales Act, section 121 measured damages for an-
ticipatory repudiation if the suit came to trial before the time for per-
formance "by the comparable market price of such goods at the time
when the aggrieved party learned of the repudiation."'7 1 No substantive
changes were made in the 1948 Code of Commercial Law or the 1950,
1951, or 1952 Uniform Commercial Code. 172 The 1957 version of section
2-723, compiled after the extensive review by New York, clarified that the
measurement of damages was for damages based on market price in sec-
tions 2-708 and 2-713.173
5. Implications of the Legislative History
Section 2-610 gives the aggrieved party a choice: to wait a commercially
reasonable time for performance or to resort to any remedy for breach.
One of the first iterations of this U.C.C. section allowed the aggrieved
party to wait until performance. 174 The New York Revision Commission
rejected this time of measurement; the importance of approval by the
state of New York resulted in the addition of "for a commercially reason-
able time." By the legislative history of section 2-610, it is clear that dam-
ages were not measured at time of performance.
Section 2-723 was written to address the problem of the unavailability
166. See id.
167. See id.
168. See U.C.C. § 2-713 (1957).
169. See U.C.C. § 2-713 (Official Draft 1952); U.C.C. § 2-713 (1957).
170. See U.C.C. § 2-713 (Official Draft 1952); U.C.C. § 2-713 (1957).
171. Karl Llewellyn's notes, supra note 141, § 121 (emphasis added).
172. See THE CODE OF COMMERCIAL LAW § 126 at 65 (1948); U.C.C. § 2-725 (Proposed
Final Draft 1950); U.C.C. § 2-723 (Proposed Final Draft No. 2 1951); U.C.C. § 2-723 (Offi-
cial Draft 1952).
173. See U.C.C. § 2-723 (1957). This implies that other remedies for anticipatory repu-
diation are not measured at time of repudiation if this section does not apply.
174. See supra notes 115-20 and accompanying text.
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of evidence.' 75 One of Llewellyn's goals was to obliterate litigation of
hypothetical damage measurements. 176 By measuring damages at time of
repudiation when the case goes to trial before the time of performance,
the Code provides a definite time to measure damages. This removes the
uncertainty of predicting future damages. But in easing evidence, Llewel-
lyn created a provision that is impossible to construe consistently with
other U.C.C. damage provisions.
D. POLICIES OF THE U.C.C.
1. Compensating the Aggrieved Party
One of the underlying philosophies of the U.C.C. is to compensate the
aggrieved party. 177 Section 1-106 explains "[t]he remedies provided by
this Act shall be liberally administered to the end that the aggrieved party
may be put in as good a position as if the other party had fully per-
formed. ' 178 Damages are limited to compensation, though they need not
be calculable by mathematical accuracy. 179
2. Mitigation and Cover
a. Mitigation
Mitigation or the doctrine of avoidable consequences is "[o]ne of the
most important rules with respect to the measure of damages."' 80 It is a
"universally accepted principle of contract law.'' The doctrine of
avoidable consequences minimizes costs by requiring a mitigating party
to bear the risk of failing to minimize his losses.182 A mitigator is denied
recovery for losses he unreasonable failed to avoid, but is given full re-
covery for costs due to any reasonable attempt to minimize losses. 183 The
primary purpose of the duty to mitigate is to avoid economic waste when
the injured party suffered damages that could have been circumvented
with reasonable efforts. 184 Nonetheless, an aggrieved party's duty to miti-
gate is limited; a plaintiff must do what is reasonable to mitigate but is not
bound by what is possible. 85
175. See 2 N.Y. STATE L. REV. COMM'N, supra note 116, at 590; Peters, supra note 4, at
265.
176. See Karl Llewellyn's notes, supra note 134, at 35.
177. See Devience, supra note 1, at 371.
178. U.C.C. § 1-106.
179. See id. cmt. 1.
180. CORBIN, supra note 11, at 314.
181. Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, The Mitigation Principle: Toward a General
Theory of Contractual Obligation, 69 VA. L. REV. 967, 967 (1983).
182. See id. at 973.
183. See id.
184. See Robert A. Hiliman, Keeping the Deal Together After Material Breach-Com-
mon Law Mitigation Rules, the U.C.C., and the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, 47 U.
COLO. L. REV. 553, 558 (1976).
185. See Clive M. Schmitthoff, The Duty to Mitigate, 1961 J. Bus. L. 361, 364 (1961).
For instance, the injured party has a duty to make substitute agreements with third parties
if reasonable, but the duty to mitigate with the breaching party is less clear. See Hillman,
supra note 183, at 559. The injured party need not "make extraordinary or impracticable
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To build on Llewellyn's concept of mitigation in the U.C.C. is a difficult
task.186 The duty to mitigate is not explicitly in the text of the U.C.C., but
is implicitly suggested in a number of Code provisions.18 7 Cover and re-
sale are two mitigation concepts invented by the redoubtable Karl
Llewellyn. 188
b. Cover
The concept of cover was one of Karl Llewellyn's useful U.C.C. inno-
vations. 8 9 Cover is a conclusive statement of the market price and re-
flects the U.C.C. philosophy of full compensation. 190 If the remedial goal
is to compensate for actual loss, then cover is superior to the hypothetical
market formula for calculating loss. 191
Karl Llewellyn considered cover to have two essential purposes: (1) "to
make it possible in the event of an anticipatory breach or any other kind
of breach, for the party who has been disappointed in performance, to
move at once, if he is a merchant, either to buy goods or as the case may
be, to get rid of the goods which the other party is not accepting"'192 and
(2) "to get rid of the litigation of a hypothetical measure of damages." 193
Cover and resale are parallel remedies for buyers and sellers. 194
The commentary to section 2-712 on cover indicates that the remedy is
"aimed at enabling him to obtain the goods he needs, thus meeting his
essential need.' 95 This demonstrates the remedy's practicality in com-
mercial transactions. "A cover transaction ensures that an aggrieved
party is compensated in full without being overcompensated."' 96
The U.C.C. suggests the market formula in section 2-713 is "completely
alternative to cover... and applies only when and to the extent that the
buyer has not covered."' 97 The Code does not require an aggrieved party
to cover.198 Nonetheless, if the buyer has reasonably covered, courts
efforts to keep damages to a minimum, nor subject himself to needless risk, expense, or
humiliation." Id. at 567-68.
186. See John E. Murray, Jr., The Emerging Article 2: The Latest Iteration, 35 Duo. L.
REV. 533, 623 (1997) ("Article 2 has proven so highly workable over almost half a century
that only a few sections require a complete overhaul.").
187. See Hillman, supra note 184, at 580.
188. See id. at 581-85.
189. See WHITE AND SUMMERS, supra note 8 § 6-3, at 285 ("Section 2-712 is a signifi-
cant departure from the prior law."); 2 N.Y. STATE L. REV. COMM'N, supra note 116, at
569; Childres, supra note 65, at 841 (cover "accurately reflect[s] Karl Llewellyn's passion to
reflect and support fact."); Peters, supra note 4, at 204, 267 (describing cover as one of the
U.C.C.'s most significant achievements).
190. See WILLIAM D. HAWKLAND, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE SERIES §2-713:03
(1984); Jackson, supra note 1, at 109.
191. See ANDERSON, supra note 1, § 9:06, at 14.
192. Karl Llewellyn's notes, supra note 134, at 34-35.
193. Id. at 35.
194. See U.C.C. § 2-712 cmt. 1.
195. Id.
196. Jackson, supra note 1, at 103.
197. Id.; see also U.C.C. § 2-713 cmt. 5.
198. See ANDERSON, supra note 1, § 8:03, at 6.
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have never enforced a higher recovery of damages under the section 2-
713 market formula instead of the cover formula.199
IV. OPINION OF COMMENTATORS
Commentators do not agonize over the aggrieved seller's market
formula remedy for anticipatory repudiation; the text of section 2-708(1)
clearly asserts that damages are to be measured at time and place of
tender.200 The aggrieved buyer's remedies for anticipatory repudiation,
however, are fraught with ambiguity and uncertainty.
201
A. MEANING OF THE TEXT
According to commentators, the language of section 2-713, "learned of
the breach," may be endowed with at least three interpretations: (1) the
time at repudiation;202 (2) a commercially reasonable time after the buyer
learns of the repudiation;20 3 and (3) the time of performance. 2°4 Each
interpretation has its defenders.20 5
1. Time of Repudiation
Early judicial interpretation of the buyer's remedies for anticipatory
repudiation easily found time of repudiation was the proper moment to
measure damages, usually without scrutiny.2°6 The plain meaning of sec-
tion 2-713 supports the time of repudiation-it seems the obvious choice
that the buyer "learns of the breach" when he learns of the repudia-
tion.207 Measuring damages early does have the advantage of limiting
damages in a rising market, the usual circumstance for a seller's repudia-
tion.208 This prevents the aggrieved party from speculating at the ex-
pense of the repudiating party. Nonetheless, most commentators criticize
this time for measuring damages.209
White and Summers list six reasons why time of repudiation is the
199. See id. § 9:06, at 14.
200. See Jackson, supra note 1, at 103-04; U.C.C. § 2-708(1). Though the text is unam-
biguous, the buyer's and seller's remedies are curiously inconsistent. A seller's remedy is
always measured at the time of performance; a buyer's remedy can be measured at a
number of different times depending on how the text is interpreted. See U.C.C. §§ 2-708,
2-713.
201. See Wallach, supra note 8, at 63.
202. See WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 8, § 6-7, at 320;. Time of repudiation is gener-
ally defined when the breaching party indicates verbally or by conduct the intention not to
fulfill the contract. See Wallach, supra note 8, at 60.
203. See WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 8, § 6-7, at 320; Wallach, supra note 8, at 60.
204. See WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 8, § 6-7, at 320; Wallach, supra note 8, at 60.
This was the common law period for measuring damages. See Wallach, supra note 8, at 60.
205. See Wallach, supra note 8, at 63.
206. See WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 8, § 6-7, at 320-21.
207. See id. at 321. "The most powerful argument of course is the language itself." Id.
at 325.
208. See Wallach, supra note 8, at 63-64.
209. See WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 8, § 6-7, at 320-21; Sebert, supra note 2, at 376;
Wallach, supra note 8, at 62.
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wrong interpretation of the U.C.C. provisions.210 First, if the drafters had
meant time of repudiation in section 2-713, they would have used "repu-
diation" instead of "breach. '211 Second, if the damages are measured at
time of repudiation, the buyer cannot utilize the waiting for a commer-
cially reasonable time for performance as permitted in section 2-610(a)
without suffering loss from following a U.C.C. sanctioned remedy.212 It is
also inconsistent with the U.C.C.'s policy of encouraging cover.213 Third,
the drafters intended the language "learned of the breach" to include
time of performance or later when the buyer actually acquired the knowl-
edge that the contract was breached in an older time when speed of com-
munication lagged.214 Fourth, time of repudiation conflicts with section
2-723.215 If "learned of the breach" always meant "learned of the repudi-
ation," section 2-723 would be unnecessary. 216 In order to give meaning
to the special rule for the suit before time of performance in section 2-
723, the time learned of the breach in section 2-723 cannot be time of
repudiation.21 7 Fifth, if section 2-713's "learned of the breach" is inter-
preted to be time of the repudiation, the section 2-713 buyer's remedy
would be inconsistent with the parallel section 2-708(1) seller's rem-
edy.218 Finally, since the pre-Code time for measuring anticipatory repu-
diation damages was time for performance, if the drafters intended to
change the common law rule, they would have at least mentioned it in a
comment.21 9 Another commentator noted that by using the date of repu-
diation, the parties are given a completely unbargained-for performance
date.220
210. See WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 8, § 6-7, at 321-24.
211. See id.
212. See U.C.C. § 2-610(a); WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 8, § 6-7, at 322; Sebert,
supra note 2, at 376; Wallach, supra note 8, at 62, 63. However, the U.C.C. is silent as to
what follows the commercially reasonable wait. See U.C.C. § 2-610. The provision gives
the aggrieved party the choice of either waiting a commercially reasonable time for per-
formance or resorting to any remedy for breach. See U.C.C. § 2-610(a), (b). The com-
ments merely state that if the party waits longer than a commercially reasonable time, he
cannot recover the resulting damages which he could have avoided. See U.C.C. § 2-610
cmt. 1. This suggests that an aggrieved party seeking to await performance will still have
access to remedies for damages, but there is a change in the election of available remedies
(otherwise the "or" between sections 2-610(a) and (b) is superfluous).
213. See Sebert, supra note 2, at 376.
214. See WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 8, § 6-7, at 322.
215. See id. at 323-24;
216. See id. Section 2-723 would be "superfluous at best, nonsensical at worst." Roy R.
Anderson, Learning of Breaches Under Section 2-713 of the Code, 40 TEx. B.J., 317, 319
(1977).
217. See WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 8, § 6-7, at 323-24; Anderson, supra note 215,
at 319.
218. See WHrrE & SUMMERS, supra note 8, § 6-7, at 324. But see supra Part III.C (indi-
cating that the legislative history suggests that buyer's and seller's remedies were not
meant to be analogous).
219. See WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 8, § 6-7, at 324. White and Summers are the
leading authorities for the conceptions that section 2-713 was not intended to change the
pre-Code rule and that it should not be interpreted to change it. See 1 ANDERSON, supra
note 1, § 9:17, at 43-44.
220. See Taylor, supra note 1, at 931.
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Using the time of repudiation as the time the buyer learned of the
breach is internally inconsistent. In interpreting the Code, it must be as-
sumed that "breach" and "repudiation" are two different concepts. Sec-
tion 2-713(1) uses the time when the buyer learned of the breach to
determine damages for repudiation. Internal consistency in this subsec-
tion demands that anticipatory repudiation is not measured at the time
learned of the repudiation, but rather at whatever time the buyer learned
of the breach.
Though most commentators also dismiss time of repudiation as the
proper moment for measuring an aggrieved buyer's damages under antic-
ipatory repudiation, there is not a clear commentator consensus between
time for performance and a commercially reasonable time after the
repudiation. 221
2. Commercially Reasonable Time after the Repudiation
The U.C.C.'s language also supports a commercially reasonable time
after repudiation as the time to measure a buyer's anticipatory repudia-
tion damages.222 A commercially reasonable time after the repudiation
does not interfere with section 2-610, which allows the aggrieved party to
wait a reasonable time before resorting to a remedy.2 3
The language of section 2-713 and its explanatory comments can sup-
port the view that damages are measured at a commercially reasonable
time following the repudiation.224 This is consistent with the comment of
section 2-713 that states market damages are to be measured in the mar-
ket in which the buyer would have covered. 225 Also, the buyer does not
actually "learn" of the breach until the reasonable waiting period has ex-
pired.226 The resale and cover provisions also support a commercially
reasonable time following repudiation.22 7 Both sections allow the ag-
grieved party a reasonable time in which to resell or cover.228 Thus dam-
ages are fixed at some time after the aggrieved party learned of the
breach, suggesting a commercially reasonable time is a viable
221. See WnrrE & SUMMERS, supra note 8, § 6-7, at 321.
222. See Sebert, supra note 2, at 376; Wallach, supra note 8, at 63; Note, UC.C. § 2-713:
Anticipatory Repudiation and the Measurement of an Aggrieved Buyer's Damages, 19 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 253,255 (1977). Measuring damages at a reasonable time after repudia-
tion "provides the most flexible and most equitable method for ascertaining a buyer's dam-
ages after a seller's anticipatory repudiation." Id.
223. See U.C.C. § 2-610(a); Wallach, supra note 8, at 63. Unfortunately there is less
case law for § 2-610(a)'s awaiting a commercially reasonable time than for § 2-610(b)'s
immediately resorting to remedies for breach. See WHrrE & SUMMERS, supra note 8, § 6-7,
at 325.
224. See Sebert, supra note 2, at 376.
225. See U.C.C. § 2-713 cmt. I ("The general baseline adopted in this section uses as a
yardstick the market in which the buyer would have obtained cover had he sought that
relief."); Sebert, supra note 2, at 376.
226. See Sebert, supra note 2, at 376-77. This rationale should not be given full
credence, however, since commentators generally have ignored this argument.
227. See Wallach, supra note 8, at 63.




One might expect that an aggrieved party, while waiting for perform-
ance and trying to convince the seller to retract his repudiation, would
evaluate the resale or cover market.230 This allows him to make a cover
or resale following a reasonable time after the waiting period expires. 231
Using a commercially reasonable time after repudiation to measure
damages inserts the concept of commercial reasonableness into the reme-
dies sections of the U.C.C. without textual support. Though section 2-610
allows a buyer to await performance for a commercially reasonable time,
there is no mention of this concept in sections 2-712, 2-713, 2-723, or their
comments. Nevertheless, commercial reasonableness is an acceptable
compromise in the search for a resolution to this Code tangle.
3. Time of Performance or Later
A number of commentators support time of performance as the proper
time to measure damages. 232 The pre-U.C.C. rule, under common law
and the Uniform Sales Act, measured anticipatory repudiation damages
for buyers and sellers like any other breach case-at the time set for per-
formance.233 Thus adoption of this measurement would be consistent
with the pre-Code law.234
Interpreting section 2-713 to mean time of performance would make
sections 2-708 and 2-713 symmetrical.235 It would also give meaning to
section 2-723 by creating a distinction between measuring damages for a
lawsuit brought before or after time of performance.236 If 2-713 refers to
time of performance, then 2-723 is "a sensible and helpful rule. '237 Mea-
suring damages at time of performance is consistent with the policy of not
penalizing the aggrieved party for his immediate choice.238 Also, if the
buyer's expectation interest is being compensated, time of performance
would make the damages as nearly equal as the "expectation-date. '239
By citing sections 2-708 and 2-713, section 2-723 implies that time of
performance is the measuring point for both buyers and sellers.240 There
229. See Wallach, supra note 8, at 63.
230. See Sebert, supra note 2, at 376 n.80.
231. See id.
232. See 1 ANDERSON, supra note 1, § 9:17, at 47; WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 8,
§§ 6-7, at 324; Taylor, supra note 1, at 931; Wallach, supra note 8, at 60. But see I ANDER.
SON, supra note 1, § 9:17, at 43-44; Charles G. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, The Mitigation
Principle: Toward a General Theory of Contractual Obligation, 69 VA. L. REV. 967, 995
(1983); Jackson, supra note 1, at 94; Sebert, supra note 2, at 375 n.77.
233. See 1 ANDERSON, supra note 1, § 9:17, at 42; Anderson, supra note 215, at 318;
Wallach, supra note 9, at 57.
234. See WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 8 § 6-7, at 324.
235. See id.; but see supra note 217 (suggesting the drafters always intended buyers and
sellers remedies to be different).
236. See WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 8, § 6-7, at 324.
237. Anderson, supra note 1.
238. See WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 8, § 6-7, at 324.
239. Taylor, supra note 1, at 931.
240. See Wallach, supra note 8, at 61.
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are no fundamental differences between the injury to a seller when a
buyer commits an anticipatory repudiation or the injury to a buyer when
the seller commits an anticipatory repudiation. 241 Thus, unless 2-713 is
measured at the time for performance like section 2-708(1), the difference
between the remedies for buyers and sellers "represents a difference
without a distinction. '242
The language "learned of the breach" can be explained as the codifica-
tion of an exception to the time for performance under New York law.243
If the drafters had intended damages to be measured at time of perform-
ance, they had no need to attach "learned" to "of the breach"; the section
could have merely stated that damages are to be measured at "the time of
the breach."'244 In the two New York cases, however, the buyer had no
knowledge of the breach-did not "learn of the breach"--until after the
time for performance had passed.245 The need for this exception was a
result of a less technological society wherein important information was
not as easily communicated. 246 By this definition, a party cannot "learn
of the breach" until there has been a breach.247
Measuring market damages when performance is due, however, is in-
consistent with section 2-610(a), which allows the aggrieved party to
await performance for only a commercially reasonable time.248 If the re-
pudiating party has not retracted the repudiation by the end of the com-
mercially reasonable time, the aggrieved buyer should cancel the contract
and cover.249 If section 2-713 damages are measured at the time of per-
formance, there is a reduced incentive to cover; the buyer could wait to
cover until performance without penalty. 250 The time of performance
measurement would also discourage efficient breaches because of the re-
pudiating party's difficulty in predicting the amount of liability at the time
of a potential repudiation. 251
If damages are assessed at the time of performance, the aggrieved
buyer receives a windfall, since the seller most likely breached in a rising
market. The aggrieved party is to be put in as good a position as if the
other party had fully performed under the contract, not in a better posi-
tion. Though time of performance is apparently the best resolution for
giving meaning to section 2-723, the comment to section 2-723 permits
flexibility in measuring damages. Accordingly, section 2-723 does not
need to be strictly followed.
241. See ANDERSON, supra note 1.
242. Id.
243. See id. at 319.
244. See id.
245. See id. at 319-20.
246. See id. at 320.
247. See Anderson, supra note 215, at 320.
248. See U.C.C. § 610(a); Sebert, supra note 2, at 375.
249. See Sebert, supra note 2, at 375.
250, See id.
251. See id. at 375 n.77.
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B. ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY ANALYSIS
Compensating an aggrieved party for its loss of expectation without
overcompensating moves goods and services to their highest value
user.252 "From the standpoint of economic efficiency, contract law should
not discourage 'efficient' breaches of contract. ' 'as3 Accordingly, the legal
system should be governed by a legal rule that facilitates efficient
breaches at minimum transaction cost.254
Professor Jackson has identified three approaches to cover after an an-
ticipatory repudiation: (1) cover on the performance date at the spot
price on that date; (2) cover at the date of repudiation at the forward
price for the date of performance; and (3) cover at the date of repudia-
tion at the spot price on that date.25  The question of when to cover
involves both the moment to enter the cover transaction and whether the
cover transaction is on a spot or forward basis. 256 A spot price is the
contemporary value of the contract duty according to the market on the
date the spot price is measured; a forward price is the current market
price of a future contract duty.257
If the forward price is greater than the contract price at repudiation,
the nonbreaching party will favor delaying cover since it has nothing to
lose 8 and may gain by delay.259 The preference of the repudiating and
nonrepudiating parties will diverge; the repudiating party will want the
nonrepudiating party to cover immediately and the nonrepudiating party
will want to delay for potential gain.26° "To assist the efficient movement
of goods to their highest value user at minimum dead-weight loss from
transaction costs, contract law presumptively should adopt a general rule
that an aggrieved buyer should cover at the forward price as of the date
of the repudiation. '261
"For most situations, an economic perspective on contract law would
have little to say about which party should get the benefits flowing from
[the repudiator's] breach, since that is a question of allocation and not of
efficiency. ' 262 Nevertheless, when a repudiating party's benefit from a
breach is greater than its liability when the nonrepudiating party covers
immediately, but its benefit is less than its probable liability when the
nonrepudiating party delays cover, the law should adopt the first option,
which produces efficient breaches unavailable in the second option.263
The adoption of the forward price at repudiation applies to both buyers'
252. See Jackson, supra note 1, at 69.
253. Sebert, supra note 2, at 375 n.77.
254. See Jackson, supra note 1, at 89 n.59.
255. See id. at 82.
256. See id.
257. See id. at 82-84.
258. The repudiating party must compensate for any detriment. See id. at 90.
259. See id.
260. See Jackson, supra note 1, at 92-93.
261. Id. at 94.




and sellers' remedies. 264
V. CASE LAW
The cases that consider both the performance date and the repudiation
date as the time for measuring anticipatory repudiation damages "indi-
cate a rather free wheeling attitude toward interpreting [section 2-713] in
light of the facts of the particular case."' 265 The overriding judicial intent
is to accomplish a fair result by approximating the injury actually suffered
by the buyer.266 The following cases are unique among the case law for
the depth of analysis of each court's conclusion.
A. CARGILL, INC. V. STAFFORD 2 6 7
The plaintiff, Cargill, Inc., bought and sold agricultural commodities;
the seller, Van Stafford, owned and operated a grain elevator. The par-
ties entered into two transactions to sell wheat. The trial court found and
the appellate court agreed that the first transaction did not afford Cargill
recovery and the second transaction was a valid and enforceable contract
that was breached by the defendant.268
The Tenth Circuit emphatically concluded that the proper time to mea-
sure damages under section 2-713's "learned of the breach" language is
time of performance, concurring with Professors White and Summers.269
The court gave two reasons: (1) the old common law rule measured dam-
ages from the performance date and the ambiguous U.C.C. text does not
indicate a clear departure from common law and (2) the drafters would
have used "repudiation" if they meant time of repudiation, as they did in
section 2-723.270
Despite their preference for time of performance, the court recognized
the importance of cover in the U.C.C.271 The aggrieved buyer can urge
continued performance of the contract as provided in Section 2-610(a),
but "at the end of a reasonable period he should cover if substitute goods
are readily available. ' 272 If the goods are available and the buyer fails to
cover, damages should be measured when the buyer should have cov-
ered.273 If the buyer had a valid reason for failure to cover, damages
should be measured at time of performance. 274 Thus the Cargill court
found the cover remedy to be compelling in anticipatory repudiation
cases.
264. See id. at 96.
265. 1 ANDERSON, supra note 1, § 9:17, at 46.
266. See id.
267. 553 F.2d 1222 (10th Cir. 1977).
268. See id. at 1225.
269. See id. at 1226.
270. See id.






B. COSDEN OIL & CHEMICAL Co. v. KARL 0. HELM
AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT 2 7 5
The plaintiff, Cosden Oil, was a manufacturer of chemical products; the
defendant, Karl 0. Helm, was an international trading company that an-
ticipated a contracted world petrochemical supply. Seven purchase or-
ders were exchanged between the two parties. Cosden brought suit for
failure to pay for delivered polystyrene; Helm counterclaimed for Cos-
den's failure to deliver polystyrene as agreed. The jury found that Cos-
den anticipatorily repudiated the fifth through seventh orders.
The plaintiff advocated measuring damages at the time of repudiation.
The defendant advocated measuring damages at the time of performance.
The court identified three potential times to measure damages for antici-
patory repudiation under the U.C.C.: (1) at repudiation; (2) at repudia-
tion plus a reasonable time; and (3) at performance.276 The court cites to
section 2-610 for authority for measuring damages at a commercially rea-
sonable time after the repudiation, reading section 2-610 in conjunction
with Section 2-713.277 The court analyzed U.C.C. section 2-713 in-depth,
concluding that the correct measure of damage for anticipatory repudia-
tion was a commercially reasonable time after the repudiation.278 Inter-
preting the language in this manner: (1) will not undercut the time section
2-610 gives the aggrieved buyer to await performance; (2) permits the
seller to retract his repudiation as permitted in section 2-611; and (3) al-
lows the buyer to evaluate cover before he elects his remedy. 279
The commercially reasonable time allows the aggrieved buyer an op-
portunity to investigate his cover possibilities in a rising market without
fear of damages being measured at time of repudiation.210 "While cover
is the preferred remedy, the Code clearly provides the option to seek
damages. ' 281 Thus, "[w]hen a buyer chooses not to cover, but to seek
damages, the market is measured at the time he could have covered-a
reasonable time after repudiation. ''282
The court recognized there were persuasive arguments for measuring
anticipatory repudiation at the time of performance, but ultimately re-
jected such a measurement. 283 The court noted, however, "[tihe interplay
among the relevant Code sections does not permit, in this context, an
interpretation that harmonizes all and leaves no loose ends.''284 Given
the U.C.C.'s theme of commercial reasonableness, the prominence of
cover, and the time an aggrieved party is permitted to await performance
275. 736 F.2d 1064 (5th Cir. 1984).
276. See id.
277. See id. at 1071.
278. See id. at 1069.
279. See id. at 1072.
280. See id.






and investigate his cover possibilities, the Fifth Circuit concluded that
"learned of the breach" adopted the "commercially reasonable time"
from section 2-610.285
C. TRINIDAD BEAN AND ELEVATOR Co. v. FROSH 286
In April 1988, Trinidad Bean and Elevator Company (Trinidad) con-
tracted with Elmo Frosh, an individual farmer, to buy Frosh's navy bean
crop for $16 per hundredweight at the end of the 1988 harvest. In May,
when the price of navy beans was equal to the contract price, Frosh repu-
diated the contract.
Due to drought conditions, the price of beans rose from $16 per hun-
dredweight in May 1988 to $37 at the time of harvest in mid-October and
$36 per hundredweight in late September when Trinidad finally bought
beans from other suppliers. The trial court rendered a verdict for Frosh
because at the time of repudiation, the contract price was equal to the
market price of $16 per hundredweight. Trinidad appealed on the ground
that the proper time to measure damages was the time of the promised
delivery in mid-October.
The court analyzed whether section 2-713's "learned of the breach" re-
fers to time of repudiation or time of performance.3 7 It concluded that
time of repudiation was the best interpretation 28 8 for the following rea-
sons: (1) time for performance gives no meaning to an aggrieved party's
option of waiting a commercially reasonable time for the other party to
perform; (2) the pre-U.C.C. law allowing the aggrieved party to wait until
performance for the repudiating party to fulfill its obligations is irrele-
vant; (3) measurement of damages at time of performance discourages
the aggrieved party from covering, which would overcompensate the
buyer and penalize the seller; and (4) the language of the cover remedy
requires the buyer to cover without unreasonable delay.289 The court did
concede the importance of cover by holding the measure of damages to
be "the difference between the contract price and the price of the goods
on the date of repudiation, so long as it would be commercially reason-
able for the buyer to cover on the date of repudiation. '' 29° The aggrieved
buyer, however, has the burden of proving that cover was commercially
unreasonable on the repudiation date.291 If there is an available, estab-
lished market, cover would be commercially reasonable as soon as possi-
ble after the repudiation. 292
285. See id. at 1073.
286. 494 N.W.2d 347 (Neb. Ct. App. 1992).
287. See id. at 351. The court did not consider the third option of a commercially rea-
sonable time or another time between time of repudiation and time of performance. See
id.
288. See id. at 352.
289. See id. at 353.
290. Id.
291. See Trinidad Bean, 494 N.W.2d at 353.
292. See id. at 354.
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D. IMPLICATIONS OF THE CASE LAW
In each of the cases addressing the time to measure damages after an
anticipatory repudiation, the court recognized the primacy of the cover
remedy. The Trinidad court used the time of repudiation to measure
damages as long as it would be commercially reasonable to cover at the
time of repudiation. The Cosden court used a commercially reasonable
time after the repudiation to measure damages, partly out of deference to
the cover remedy. The Cargill court used cover as the time to assess
damages.
The courts have implemented a solution to the confusion of the Code
sections that the commentators have not considered.
VI. THE SOLUTION
The best solution is to consider the primacy of cover under the U.C.C.
Since one of the U.C.C. policies is to compensate the aggrieved party,
cover should be used to resolve this quandary. As the Fifth Circuit notes,
no solution can resolve all questions relating to damages under anticipa-
tory repudiation. The ambiguous and conflicting language of the Code
guarantees this. But most of the issues can be resolved.
The Cosden court was disingenuous in applying section 2-610 to section
2-713. There is no indication in the Code that section 2-610 modifies sec-
tion 2-713. It would be inconsistent to apply an unrelated section just to
resolve statutory complications. The better result is for a court to use the
time the aggrieved party ought to cover, which should still be a commer-
cially reasonable time. Cover is the commercially reasonable action when
a buyer faces an anticipatory repudiation. And the cover remedy satisfies
the policy in section 1-106 of fully compensating the aggrieved party. Us-
ing the time the buyer should cover to measure damages acknowledges
the mitigation concept, which is an implicit policy in the U.C.C.
Using the time the buyer can and should cover penalizes neither the
aggrieved buyer nor the repudiating seller. The buyer obtains the goods
he needs and the seller will not pay an excessively exorbitant judgment.
In addition, neither party receives a windfall. The seller will most likely
anticipatorily repudiate a contract in a rising market. If repudiation were
the time to measure damages, the seller would receive a windfall by not
paying the difference of the cost of the goods between time of repudia-
tion and the time the buyer covers. By measuring damages at the time
the buyer should cover, the seller is giving the buyer his bargained-for
expectation interest. If performance were the time to measure damages,
the buyer would have no economic incentive to cover and could use the
time between repudiation and performance to wait for the price to in-
crease. This would be an inefficient breach because the seller would pay




If the buyer is unable to cover if the goods are scarce or because it is
impossible for him to gather the resources to purchase the goods, cover is
not a viable remedy, and the buyer's damages should be measured at time
of performance. The aggrieved buyer should not be penalized for not
being able to cover. Using the time of performance when the buyer can-
not cover is still commercially reasonable.
This proposal of using cover as the time to measure damages resolves
some of the complications among the Code provisions. Cover does not
conflict with "learned of the breach" in section 2-713(1). The buyer will
"learn" of the breach sometime after repudiation when he realizes that
the seller will not perform. When he realizes that the seller will not per-
form, he should cover.
Using cover also allows the buyer to wait a commercially reasonable
time for performance. Since the cover remedy itself is a commercially
reasonable action for a buyer, the waiting period in section 2-610 is satis-
fied. This is consistent with the comment of section 2-610, which states
that if the aggrieved party "awaits performance beyond a commercially
reasonable time he cannot recover the resulting damages which he should
have avoided. '293 This implicates the policy of mitigation that runs
throughout the Code. Cover is the ultimate mitigation remedy.
Measuring damages for anticipatory repudiation at the time the buyer
should cover does not nullify the purpose of section 2-723 as using the
time of repudiation does. If "learned of the breach" in section 2-713(1)
meant "learned of the repudiation," section 2-723 would be superfluous.
When the question of damages for anticipatory repudiation is litigated
before time of performance, section 2-723 becomes operative and dam-
ages are measured at time of repudiation. If the buyer should have cov-
ered, regardless of whether time of performance has arrived, damages
should still be measured at the time the buyer should have covered, even
under section 2-723. The comment to section 2-723 allows the court lee-
way to develop different methods of calculating damages and using a dif-
ferent moment to determine damages qualifies.294
By using the time that the buyer should cover as the time to measure
the buyer's damages, a court compensates the buyer and fulfills the
Code's expectation of mitigation of damages. If the buyer cannot cover,
he is compensated at time of performance.
VII. CONCLUSION
For a court to entertain the question of when to measure damages for
anticipatory repudiation requires a rare situation. To create this question
requires two things: "(1) an anticipatory repudiation; and (2) a buyer who
cannot use the goods under the time of performance or who is unable to
293. U.C.C. § 2-610, cmt. 1.
294. U.C.C. § 2-723, cmt.
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cover. ' 295 When this question does arise, the best solution is to use the
Code's innovative cover remedy. Using the time in which the buyer
should cover resolves most of the confusion of the entangled Code
provisions.
295. ANDERSON, supra note 1.
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